

## **Statement 2 – Clive Stevens**

A topic close to my heart, I'm pleased this issue has been chosen and reviewed.

### **My understanding is that when it comes to risk assessments the roles of Audit Committee and of Scrutiny differ but overlap.**

Audit Committee is responsible for checking that the risk management system is functioning; risks are identified, threats, outcomes and probabilities are assessed. Whereas for Scrutiny, their task is to look deeply into a risk and see if the mitigations approved by Cabinet will actually improve the system. One of Audit's roles is to verify that Cabinet and Scrutiny are doing this.

### **On the face of it Corporate Risk CRR32 has assessed the threat and level well.**

I hope most will agree that it is extremely likely Bristol will not meet the target (on the report set at 800 per year) and that the harm, outcome of not doing this is extremely serious. So a risk rating of 28, the maximum, seems correct.

### **And have Cabinet and Scrutiny done their jobs?**

One would assume too that Growth and Regen Scrutiny have looked in detail at these mitigations and the Cabinet reports and come to a conclusion about their likely effectiveness. I do not know whether they have or haven't but I think it is part of Audit Committee's job to find out.

### **So how to account for Bristol's long term failure to deliver affordable housing?**

Bristol has consistently failed to meet its affordable housing needs for the last twenty years maybe more, perhaps OK just the odd year; this is long term systemic failure. The Housing Needs Assessment in 2009 stated then that affordable housing needs were over 1,000 a year, supply wasn't keeping up and the backlog (I assume the wait list) was 7,000.

The undersupply continued to get worse. The now abandoned Joint Spatial Plan Publication Nov 2017 (Policy 3) stated that the estimated affordable housing need for the Bristol and Bath Housing Areas was 32,200 over the coming 20 years, but even with all interventions they could only plan delivery of 24,500 (The 2019 draft Local Plan initially had 19,500 of this for Bristol). So 24,500 was carried forward in the JSP as the target for both Housing Market Areas; that is 8,000 less than the need. Although that wasn't the cause of the JSP being trashed, in my view, it should have been. What is the cause of such a long term systemic failure? Is this being considered at the wrong level? WECA has been in existence for four years now. Does it look at this as a strategic risk, what are its systems to manage and secure affordable housing. What and how does it estimate the need? What actions is it taking, what is the scrutiny?

**CRR32 is a new measure. It is clearly expressed, but lack of affordable housing has been an identified risk for decades. After twenty years of failure on this, do you think that the current risk CRR32, its mitigations and history of failure demonstrates evidence of a functioning risk management system? I would argue no.**